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“Constitution[al] principle[s] are too unrefined, standing alone,” to resolve 
issues that matter most. 
—Professor Steven D. Smith1 
“[T]he ideals of neutrality and equality [are] incapable of supporting a viable 
liberal community.” 
—Professor Steven D. Smith2 
I. Introduction: Of Equality and Constitutionalism 
The two most prominent constitutional and jurisprudential prin-
ciples that have been invoked in support of claims for legalization of 
same-sex marriage may be claims of “right” and claims of “equality.” 
The “rights” claims assert that there is a basic, recognized legal right 
to marry a person of the same-sex. The “equality” claims are based on 
notions of equivalence, tolerance, respect, fairness, and pluralism. Of 
those, the most effective and successful claims for same-sex marriage 
have been based on equality principles emphasizing equivalence, tol-
erance, and fairness. 
This paper examines the extent to which equality claims have been 
used to require the legalization of same-sex marriage in American state 
and federal legal doctrine, as a matter of comparative interstate consti-
tutional law. It also examines whether and how equality principles have 
been used to require the legalization of same-sex marriage in other na-
tions, an exercise of comparative intercountry constitutional law. It 
then considers whether equality principles justify requiring the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage as a matter of general jurisprudential prin-
ciples. 
The paper begins in Part II, by describing the status of same-sex 
marriage in the United States of America and in the world. It also re-
views the text of state and national constitutional provisions regarding 
same-sex marriage and the controlling judicial opinions in search of 
the jurisprudential theories that underlie the constitutional legaliza-
tion or rejection of same-sex marriage. 
Part III considers whether equality principles require the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage as a matter of U.S. constitutional doctrine 
and human rights doctrines. The prevailing and most coherent answer 
 
 1. Steven D. Smith, Getting Over Equality 2 (2001) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted). 
 2. Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 305, 307 (1990). 
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to the doctrinal question is that in most legal systems in this country 
and in the world, equality principles are not interpreted to require le-
galization of same-sex marriage as a matter of constitutional or funda-
ment human rights doctrines, but that in only very few legal systems 
have equality doctrines been interpreted to require legalization of 
same-sex marriage. Judicial imposition of same-sex marriage by means 
of creative interpretation and extension of equality principles of con-
stitutional law is illegitimate. 
Likewise, Part IV shows that as a matter of general moral philoso-
phy or jurisprudence, equality principles provide little support for 
claims to legalize same-sex marriage. However, liberty provides a so-
lution to the conundrum of equality and tolerance, and upon that basis 
the equality principles might support legal recognition of some recog-
nition of same-sex unions with benefits, privileges, and responsibilities. 
In conclusion, Part V summarizes that in both practice and theory, 
equality principles provide little support for legalization of same-sex 
marriage in U.S. constitutional doctrine, comparative international 
constitutional law, or as a matter of the general jurisprudential, or hu-
man rights principles. 
It is apparent that in politics, law, and jurisprudential principles 
“equality” has many different dimensions and many varied meanings. 
For example, the notion of equality in one sense can mean equivalence; 
in another aspect it can mean tolerance; it can also mean nondiscrimina-
tion; in another usage, it can mean neutrality; in another perspective it 
can mean pluralism; and in another dimension, equality can mean respect 
or dignity. Each of these equality principles provides stronger or 
weaker support for the claim for legalization of same-sex marriage than 
others. Whether equality requires legalization of same-sex marriage 
depends in part on which definition or dimension of equality is used. 
It also appears that which meaning or dimension of equality is used 
and how it is interpreted and applied depends in part on who is using 
and applying it. The structural context is very important; “who de-
cides” (i.e., which branch, agency, level or process of government 
makes the decision) profoundly influences which meaning of equality 
will be used and how it will be interpreted. In the United States, the 
method used to decide the issue has been driven by the substance of 
the policy, and the method and decision-maker have largely controlled 
the outcome. When democratic, grass-roots-based methods are used 
to settle the issue, the outcome is likely to be a prohibition of same-sex 
marriage. In contrast, the more non-democratic and elitist or insulated 
the method and decision-making body, the more likely it is that the 
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outcome will be the legalization of same-sex marriage. The closer the 
decision-making gets to the people (through direct democratic process 
or electorally-accountable processes and branches), the more likely the 
decision is to reject same-sex marriage and the claim that equality re-
quires legalizing same-sex marriage. However, the further removed 
from the people (especially when remotely accountable or life-tenured 
judges are making the decision), the more likely it is that the decision 
will conclude that equality principles require legalizing same-sex mar-
riage. 
Additionally, there appears to be a strong social-cultural influence 
upon which meaning or aspect of equality will be used and how it will 
be interpreted in determining whether equality requires legalization of 
same-sex marriage. For example, in the United States, the social and 
cultural values generally tend to reflect conservative notions of equality 
and to favor application of limited or conservative interpretations of 
equality. Thus, in forty-one3 of fifty states, conservative notions of 
equality prevail, and those 82% of the states do not permit same-sex 
marriage. In over 90% of the states (thirty-one out of thirty-four states 
to date) where the issue of legalizing same-sex marriage had come be-
fore voters, same-sex marriage has been rejected soundly. All thirty-
one states4 where same-sex marriage has been constitutionally barred 
have accomplished that by democratic processes; no court in America 
has construed a state (or federal) constitution as forbidding the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage. On the other hand, in half of the Ameri-
can states where same-sex marriage ever has been or now is allowed, 
the legalization of same-sex marriage was decreed or initiated by judi-
cial interpretation of a constitutional provision.5 Interestingly, by con-
 
 3. See infra Appendix I.A. 
 4. See infra Appendix II. 
 5. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that California statutes 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional and violated the state’s equal-pro-
tection clause for same-sex couples—a ruling that was overturned by California voters less than 
five months later when they approved Proposition 8); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that Connecticut laws restricting marriage to heterosexual cou-
ples violated same-sex couples’ equal-protection rights); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 
2009) (holding that statutes limiting civil marriage to heterosexual unions violated the equal-
protection rights of same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, and thus statutory language 
should be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian couples full access to civil 
marriages); In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (holding 
that civil unions are not equal to marriages and, thus, allowing same-sex marriages in Massachu-
setts); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the 
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trast, outside of the United States, same-sex marriage has been legal-
ized by democratic processes mostly; in nine of the eleven nations6 that 
have legalized same-sex marriage, including all eight European nations 
where same-sex marriage is legal, plus in Argentina, same-sex marriage 
was legalized by legislative processes, and in only two of those nations 
(Canada and South Africa) was that policy initiated by judicial shove 
or nudge. So the democratic values of the society and culture are re-
flected in whether constitutional equality provisions are deemed to re-
quire legalization of same-sex marriage. 
Nearly all nations in the world today are “democratic” in some 
sense; but “democracy” (like “equality”) has many meanings, and there 
are different degrees of commitment to and implementation of demo-
cratic principles of government. The circumvention of citizens in the 
processes of deciding highly controversial policy issues, such as 
whether to legalize same-sex marriage in a jurisdiction,7 may be a good 
measure of the degree of commitment to, and the functional validity 
of, democratic processes in a particular jurisdiction. So the way in 
which the political battles over same-sex marriage are decided may im-
plicate democratic constitutionalism in some very profound ways that 
may have deeper significance for political society than the marriage 
policy preference itself. 
II. The Status of Marriage and Other Domestic 
Relationships in the Law 
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Equivalent Civil Unions 
1. Same-sex unions have marriage-like status in very few jurisdictions 
In the United States of America there has been a vigorous, deter-
mined movement to legalize same-sex marriage for nearly twenty 
years.8 As Appendix I.A. shows, since 2004, same-sex marriage has 
 
state of Massachusetts may not deny the protections, benefits, and obligations of marriage to 
same-sex unions); see also Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (2010); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 
(Vt. 1999); 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33. 
 6. See infra Appendix I.B. 
 7. See Dominique Ludvigson, Circumventing Citizens on Marriage: A Survey 3 
(The Heritage Foundation 2012) (“Largely unable to redefine marriage through democratic pro-
cesses, advocates have resorted to the courts to do so.”). 
 8. Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, The Alaska Mar-
riage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 Alaska L. Rev. 213 (1999); David 
Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. Tex. L. 
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been legalized in nine9 of the fifty United States of America, as well as 
in the District of Columbia and in two (of 564) American Indian 
Tribes.10 Also, same-sex unions with legal status and benefits equiva-
lent to marriage (herein “civil unions”) have been created in eight 
other U.S. states.11 Thus, seventeen U.S. states give same-sex relations 
marital or marriage-equivalent legal status and benefits. Additionally, 
two other states now allow some form of same-sex partnership regis-
tration with limited, selected benefits—less than the total bundle of 
benefits extended to marriages or civil unions.12 
Globally, as Appendix I.B. shows, same-sex marriage has been le-
galized in ten or eleven nations of 193 sovereign nations recognized by 
the United Nations (depending on whether South Africa’s ambiguous 
law is counted as creating same-sex marriages or civil unions), all since 
the year 2000 when the Netherlands became the first jurisdiction in 
the world to allow same-sex marriage.13 Additionally, same-sex unions 
 
Rev. 1, 11 (1997); David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning 
and Constitutionality, 22 Haw. L. Rev. 19 (2000); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As 
Hawaii Goes, First Things, Apr. 1997, at 33. 
 9. The number of states increased from six to nine as a result of November 2012 ballot 
initiatives in Maine, Maryland, and Washington. Chelsea J. Carter & Allison Brennan, Maryland, 
Maine, Washington Approve Same-Sex Marriage; 2 States Legalize Pot, CNN Politics (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/01/politics/ballot-initiatives. 
 10. See infra Appendix I (including in the list states that voted to legalize same-sex mar-
riage in 2012, regardless of when those new laws go into effect). Additionally, California legalized 
same-sex marriage by judicial decree briefly in 2008, but the voters quickly overturned that by 
passing Proposition 8 in November 2008. Lower-court rulings by state courts in Hawaii and 
(non-finally) in Alaska also legalized or ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, but before those 
rulings became effective, voters in each state adopted amendments to the state constitutions to 
prohibit same-sex marriage. Charles M. Cannizzaro, Marriage in California: Is the Federal Lawsuit 
Against Proposition 8 About Applying the Fourteenth Amendment or Preserving Federalism?, 38 Pepp. 
L. Rev. 161, 162–66 (2010). 
 11. The term “civil unions” is an inexact term, generally used (and used herein) to refer to 
formal same-sex legal relationships that enjoy all, or substantially all, of the benefits, privileges, 
and duties of marriage. However, such relationships are denominated “domestic partnerships” in 
some states, including California and Nevada. Cal. Fam. Code § 297 (West 2005); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 122A.010–122A.510 (2009). By the same token, formally-created and legally-recog-
nized same-sex legal relationships that are afforded less than identical, or substantially-identical, 
legal rights, duties and benefits are generally called “domestic partnerships,” but could just as 
well be called “civil unions.” See also Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some 
Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 401 (2002). 
 12. See infra Appendix I.A. 
 13. One of these eleven nations, South Africa, enacted a “Civil Union Act” in 2006 that 
allows same-sex couples to enter that new status by using a marriage ceremony or civil partner-
ship registration, allows the relationship to be called a marriage or civil partnership, and grants 
most of the same rights to such relationships as are enjoyed by marriages. But despite the use of 
the label and formation ceremony of “marriage,” the legal status created is technically a “civil 
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equivalent to marriage have been created in seventeen or sixteen addi-
tional nations (again depending on whether South Africa is counted in 
the same-sex marriage list). Moreover, same-sex registrations with 
some limited benefits are provided in at least five other nations.14 
Thus, from no nations or American states allowing same-sex mar-
riage in 2000 (and throughout all prior legal history), there now are 
ten (or arguably eleven) nations and nine U.S. states with same-sex 
marriage at the beginning of 2013; and from only three nations and no 
U.S. states with marriage-equivalent civil unions in 1995, there are 
seventeen (or arguably sixteen) nations and eight American states with 
such unions at the dawn of 2013. Additionally, another half-dozen na-
tions and two states provide limited recognition and specific benefits 
for same-sex couples. In summary, today about one-seventh of all sov-
ereign nations and one-third of the American states now offer marriage 
or marriage-equivalent legal status and benefits to same-sex couples. 
2. Same-sex unions lack marriage-like status in most jurisdictions 
The other side of the foregoing statistics is that in forty-one of the 
fifty U.S. states and in 183 of the 193 sovereign nations in the world 
(or, arguably, 182—depending on how South Africa’s law is classified), 
same-sex marriage is prohibited or not generally permitted. Addition-
ally, the “backlash” grassroots movement rejecting same-sex marriage 
has turned out to be quite substantial in America and internationally. 
In the past decade thirty-one states (62% of all American states) have 
passed state-constitutional amendments defining marriage as the un-
ion of husband and wife.15 In May 2012, a state marriage amendment 
 
union.” So even though South Africa usually is counted with the nations that have legalized 
“same-sex marriage,” as a matter of legal analysis, it probably does not belong there but should 
be listed with the nations that have legalized “civil unions.” Civil Union Act 29441 of 2006 (S. 
Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843. 
 14. See infra Appendix I.B. A few subordinate jurisdictions (such as individual cities or 
counties or provinces) have also recognized or created same-sex marriage, but most such inferior 
jurisdictions lack the governance authority to regulate marriage and similar domestic relation-
ships. 
 15. See infra Appendix II.A; see also Ala. Const., amend. 774; Alaska Const., art. I, § 
25; Ariz. Const., art. 30, § 1 (Prop. 102); Ark. Const., amend. 83; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 
(Prop. 8); Colo. Const., art. II, § 31; Fla. Const. art. 1, § 27; Ga. Const., art I, § 4, para. 1; 
Idaho Const., art. III, § 28; Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const., § 233A; La. Const., art. 
XII, § 15; Mich. Const., art. I, § 25; Miss. Const., § 263-A; Mo. Const., art. I, § 33; Mont. 
Const., art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const., art. I, § 29; Nev. Const., art. I, § 21; N.D. Const., art. 
XI, § 28; Ohio Const., art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const., art. II, § 35; Or. Const., art. XV, § 5a; 
S.C. Const., art. XVII, § XV; S.D. Const., XXI, § 9; Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 18; Tex. 
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was approved by voters in North Carolina with over 61% of the vote.16 
But in November 2012, voters in Minnesota became the first voters in 
thirty-two states to decline to pass a state marriage amendment, with 
nearly 52.6% of the voters there rejecting it.17 In all 32 states in which 
same-sex marriage had been on the ballot before November 2012 (in-
cluding Maine where in 2009 a new law allowing same-sex marriage 
was rejected by the “people’s veto”) the people had decisively rejected 
same-sex marriage. Now there are forty-one states (including thirty-
one with constitutional amendments on point) rejecting same-sex mar-
riage, and nine states allowing same-sex marriage. Overall, adding to-
gether all the votes, the total vote against same-sex marriage in the 
thirty-four states where voters have voted on state marriage amend-
ments is over sixty percent (62%).18 
Twenty of the existing state constitutional amendments also pro-
hibit the creation of marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions, regard-
less of what it is called.19 At least forty-one states have passed their own 
“defense of marriage” policies by statute, constitutional amendment, 
or both. Such defense-of-marriage policies effectively prohibit courts 
in those states from recognizing same-sex marriages performed in 
other jurisdictions, and also express strong public policy in the states 
barring same-sex marriage recognition.20 Nearly two-thirds of Amer-
 
Const., art. I, § 32; Utah Const., art. I, § 29; Va. Const., art. I, § 15-A; Wis. Const., art. 
XIII, § 13. 
 16. North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), Ballotpedia.org, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amend-
ment_1_%28May_2012%29 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 17. Minnesota Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), Ballotpedia.org, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Minnesota_Same-Sex_Marriage_Amendment,_Amend-
ment_1_%282012%29 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 18. See Lynn D. Wardle, Involuntary Imports: Williams, Lutwak, the Defense of Marriage 
Act, Federalism, and “Thick” and “Thin” Conceptions of Marriage, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 771, app. at 
826 (2012) (recognizing that those figures must be adjusted by the 2012 votes in North Carolina, 
Maine, Maryland, and Washington). 
 19. See infra Appendix II.B. 
 20. This includes the thirty substantive marriage amendment states, see infra Appendix 
II.A., plus the following states which have adopted statutory same-sex marriage non-recognition 
acts but no constitutional provision. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-101 (2007); Cal. Fam. Code 
§ 308.5 (West 2004); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 
(West 2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-3 (1999); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/212 (West 
1999); Ind. Code Ann. § 31–11–1–1 (2007); Iowa Code §595.2 (2002); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 517.01 (West, 2006); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2 (2011); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704 
(West 2010). W. Va. Code § 48-2-603 (2002). 
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ican states (thirty-three states) clearly reject and prohibit either mar-
riage or any marriage-like legal status or marital benefits for same-sex 
couples.21 Currently, forty-one American states (82%) recognize only 
dual-gender marriage—defining marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman only. 
Internationally, the legal rejection of same-sex marriage is the 
dominant and growing rule of national constitutional law. Forty-seven 
nations—twenty-four percent (24%) of the 193 sovereign nations rec-
ognized by the United Nations—have constitutional provisions that 
expressly define or by gendered terms clearly refer to marriage as a 
conjugal union of a man and a woman.22 All but one of these constitu-
tional provisions has been adopted since 1970.23 By contrast, no na-
tional constitution expressly protects or requires same-sex marriage.24 
 
 21. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage: Same-
Sex Marriage and “the Tragedy of the Commons,” 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 441 (2008). 
 22. See the constitutions of The Republic of Armenia, May 7, 1995, art. 32; The Republic 
of Azerbaijan, Nov. 12, 1995, art. 34; The Republic of Belarus, 1994, art. 32; The Federative 
Republic of Brazil, 1988, art. 226; The Republic of Bulgaria, July 13, 1991, art. 46; Burkina Faso, 
Jun. 2, 1991, art. 23; The Kingdom of Cambodia, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 45; The People’s Republic 
of China, 1982, art. 49; Colombia, 1991, art. 42; The Republic of Cuba, 1976, art. 36; The Re-
public of Ecuador, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 38; Eritrea, May 23, 1997, art. 22; The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Dec. 8, 1994, art. 34; The Second Republic of The Gambia, Aug. 8, 1996, 
art. 27; The Republic of Honduras, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 112; Japan, May 3, 1947, art. 24; The 
Republic of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, art. 110; The Republic of Lithuania, Oct. 25, 1992, art. 38; 
The Republic of Malawi, May 18, 1994, art. 22; The Republic of Moldova, July 29, 1994, art. 48; 
The Republic of Montenegro, Oct. 19, 2007, art. 71; The Republic of Namibia, 1990, art. 14; 
The Republic of Nicaragua, Nov. 19, 1986, art. 72; The Republic of Paraguay, June 20, 1992, 
arts. 49–52 ; The Republic of Peru, Oct. 31, 1993, art. 5; The Republic of Poland, Apr. 2, 1997, 
art. 18; The Republic of Serbia, art. 62; The Republic of Suriname, Oct. 30, 1987, art. 35; The 
Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005, art. 27; The Republic of Tajikistan, Nov. 6, 1994, art. 33; Turk-
menistan, Aug. 15, 2003, art. 25; The Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 31; Ukraine, June 28, 1996, 
art. 51; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999, art. 77; The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
Apr. 18, 1992, art. 64. 
 23. The Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1947, is the only such constitution 
adopted before 1970 that limits marriage to male-female couples. Constitution of Japan, supra 
note 22. 
 24. But by creative judicial interpretation of equality provisions, not marriage provisions, 
courts in Canada and South Africa have distilled a requirement for legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage. See Harrison v. Canada, [2005] NBQB 232, 290 N.B.R.2d 70 (Can.); Minister of Foreign 
Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 12 (S. Afr.). It also is reported that a court in Nepal 
has ruled that same-sex couples should be able to marry or have some similar status, but that 
ruling has not had any legal effect yet. Nepal Lesbian Wedding: U.S. Couple Weds in Nation’s First 
Public Same-Sex Ceremony, Huff Post World (June 20, 2011), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2011/06/20/nepal-lesbian-wedding-us-couple-weds-ceremony-
_n_880315.html#s294953 (explaining that two women from Denver wed in Nepal, but “[s]ame-
sex marriages are not legal in Nepal . . . . The laws are being drafted . . . .”). 
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Additionally, same-sex marriage is prohibited either by statute, com-
mon law, or binding legal custom in all nations that do not explicitly 
forbid or allow same-sex marriage in their constitutions. 
Internationally, the constitutional language of many of the forty-
seven25 nations that appear to bar same-sex marriage appears to con-
stitutionalize custom—the custom of marriage being the gender-inte-
grative union of man and women. The language in those constitutional 
provisions suggests that the drafters of the constitution may not have 
specifically or extensively considered whether the constitution should 
prohibit same-sex marriage, but only decided that the established cus-
tom of marriage as a dual-gender legal relationship should receive par-
ticular constitutional protection. Whether these constitutional provi-
sions will be interpreted as reserving the legal status of marriage 
exclusively for (only) male-female couples or merely inclusively (includ-
ing at least male-female couples) when/if political pressures for same-
sex marriage arise in those nations is a political question the answer to 
which is uncertain. Since the textual implication in most cases is that a 
unique constitutional protection was intended to be given to the 
unique, historical institution of dual-gender integrative marriages, it is 
likely that most of those constitutional provisions will be interpreted 
exclusively as reserving the particular status of “marriage” for male-fe-
male unions. However, such interpretation does not necessarily bar the 
creation of some other domestic status, and perhaps may even allow 
granting an equivalent legal status with equivalent legal rights and ben-
efits. Yet, given the special interest politics of same-sex marriage, it is 
 
 25. See The Constitutions of The Republic of Armenia, May 7, 1995, art. 32; The Repub-
lic of Azerbaijan, Nov. 12, 1995, art. 34; The Republic of Belarus, 1994, art. 32; The Federative 
Republic of Brazil, 1988, art. 226; The Republic of Bulgaria, July 13, 1991, art. 46; Burkina Faso, 
Jun. 2, 1991, art. 23; The Kingdom of Cambodia, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 45; The People’s Republic 
of China, 1982, art. 49; Colombia, 1991, art. 42; The Republic of Cuba, 1976, art. 36; The Re-
public of Ecuador, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 38; Eritrea, May 23, 1997, art. 22; The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Dec. 8, 1994, art. 34; The Second Republic of The Gambia, Aug. 8, 1996, 
art. 27; The Republic of Honduras, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 112; Japan, May 3, 1947, art. 24; The 
Republic of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, art. 110; The Republic of Lithuania, Oct. 25, 1992, art. 38; 
The Republic of Malawi, May 18, 1994, art. 22; The Republic of Moldova, July 29, 1994, art. 48; 
The Republic of Montenegro, Oct. 19, 2007, art. 71; The Republic of Namibia, 1990, art. 14; 
The Republic of Nicaragua, Nov. 19, 1986, art. 72; The Republic of Paraguay, June 20, 1992, 
arts. 49, 50, 51, 52; The Republic of Peru, Oct. 31, 1993, art. 5; The Republic of Poland, Apr. 2, 
1997, art. 18; The Republic of Serbia, art. 62; The Republic of Suriname, Oct. 30, 1987, art. 35; 
The Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005, art. 27; The Republic of Tajikistan, Nov. 6, 1994, art. 33; 
Turkmenistan, Aug. 15, 2003, art. 25; The Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 31; Ukraine, June 28, 
1996, art. 51; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999 art. 77; The Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Apr. 18, 1992, art. 64. 
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not likely that a few of those provisions may be interpreted inclusively 
as not disallowing same-sex marriage. 
In a few nations the language26 or the history of the drafting27 of 
the constitutional provision makes it clear that it was intended specifi-
cally to ban same-sex marriage. However, whether such clear intent 
and constitutional language will be respected is not certain. The 
proper enactment by the citizens of a modern liberal democracy of a 
constitutional amendment or provision that specifically and unequivo-
cally is intended to and does explicitly ban same-sex marriage is no 
guarantee that other government officers (especially judges) will not 
disregard, dismiss, and disobey that constitutional languageas the 
federal district and appellate court rulings that, if upheld, will invali-
date and overturn Proposition 828 clearly show.29 
Less than one-seventh of sovereign nations and just one-third of 
the American states allow same-sex couples to marry or offer them an-
other domestic relations legal status with marriage-equivalent legal 
benefits. Eighty-three percent (83%) of the nations and sixty-two per-
cent (62%) of the states in this country give no legal domestic relation-
ship status or benefits to same-sex couples. 
III. Whether the Constitutional Doctrine of Equality 
Supports Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage 
Principles of equality, including tolerance and pluralism, have two 
dimensions of relevance to the same-sex marriage debates. The first is 
the dimension of equality as a doctrine of constitutional law. The sec-
ond is equality as a general principle of jurisprudence, philosophy, and 
legal theory. Both provide little support for the constitutional claims 
for same-sex marriage. This part examines the doctrinal equality 
 
 26. See, e.g., The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 
2011, Jul. 9, 2011, art. 15, available at http://bit.ly/ZBghaz (“Every person of marriageable age 
shall have the right to marry a person of the opposite sex and to found a family . . . .”); see also Consti-
tution of Latvia, Constitution of Uganda infra note 22. 
 27. See, e.g., The Fundamental Law of Hungary [Constitution] Apr. 25, 2011, art. 
L; Constitution of Latvia, Feb. 22, 1922, ch. VIII, art. 110; see also Pablo Gorondi, Hungary 
Passes New Conservative Constitution, Star Tribune (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www.star-
tribune.com/printarticle/?id=120060264. 
 28. Proposition 8 was the 2008 California constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage. 
 29. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 
(2012). 
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claims. 
A. Equality Claims for Same-Sex Marriage in State Constitutional Law 
All thirty-one of the state marriage amendments barring same-sex 
marriage clearly and emphatically reject the concept that same-sex un-
ions are the same as, or equal to, or equivalent to dual-gendered insti-
tution of “marriage.” Indeed, the common, main purposes of all these 
state marriage amendments are (1) to constitutionally confirm that 
marriage between a man and a woman is a unique relationship, a 
uniquely valuable kind of domestic relationship, (2) to constitutionally 
limit the legal status of marriage to male-female couples only, and (3) 
to constitutionally prohibit giving the legal status of “marriage” to 
same-sex relationships. By confining the specific legal institution and 
status of “marriage” exclusively to gender-integrating male-female un-
ions, the core, inescapable message of all of these state marriage 
amendments is that marriage is a unique and uniquely important legal 
and social institution, and that an indispensable element of the value 
of marriage as an institution to society is that it unites a man and a 
woman. Thus, in a significant majority (62%) of the American states, 
the peoplethe ultimate source and ultimate authority on the mean-
ing of constitutional rights and dutieshave rejected the proposal that 
same-sex couples and male-female couples are equal in terms of the 
purposes and qualities of marriage. 
These popularly-enacted constitutional provisions are not merely 
significant politically, but they also are very significant for state con-
stitutional law doctrine. The 2008-09 scenario in California illustrates 
this point. After the California Supreme Court in May 2008 inter-
preted the state constitution as mandating the legalization of same-sex 
marriage (based in part on its interpretation of an equality principle),30 
the people of California in November 2008 voted to amend their state 
constitution by adopting Proposition 8 that defined marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman.31 When that amendment was attacked 
by advocates of same-sex marriage, the state supreme court rejected 
that challenge, respected the constitutional will of the people, and up-
held the state marriage amendment.32 Thus, as a matter of clearly-ex-
pressed state constitutional law in nearly two-thirds of the states, the 
 
 30. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419, 428 (Cal. 2008). 
 31. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. 
 32. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (2009). 
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constitutional equality claim to same-sex marriage has been decisively 
rejected. 
Twenty of those thirty-one state marriage amendments contain 
words like “equivalent” or “similar” or other words describing compa-
rability to prohibit not only same-sex marriage but also forbid creating 
or legally recognizing domestic relationships for same-sex couples (and 
in some states also other couples) that are or present themselves as be-
ing “equivalent” or substantially “similar” to dual-gendered marriage 
in status or substance.33 These amendments put an exclamation point 
after their rejection of the equality claim for same-sex unionsrepu-
diating not only the claim for same-sex unions as legally entitled to 
institutional marriage status—but also rejecting the claim of equiva-
lence in eligibility for the same or similar bundles of benefits and priv-
ileges. These twenty marriage amendments express one or both of two 
equality value positions: (1) that same-sex (and in some states, other 
non-marital) domestic relationships do not merit (deserve or justify or 
need) the same or equivalent of legal status, benefits, privileges, rights 
and responsibilities as are provided to male-female marital unions; or 
(2) that conferring equal or equivalent-to-marital legal packages of 
benefits, duties and responsibilities upon same-sex (and, usually, other 
non-marital) domestic relations creates inequality that could harm and 
undermine or endanger the more important gender-integrating social 
institution of marriage or would harm or endanger society or particu-
lar vulnerable members of society. Both potential positions of these 
amendments clearly reject the claim of the equality and equivalence of 
same-sex unions to marriage.34 
However, more than one-third of these thirty-one state marriage 
amendments (eleven of them) do not bar the granting of equivalent 
legal rights and benefits to same-sex (and other) couples under another 
legal status, such as “civil unions.” This suggests that those eleven 
states and the eight states that have civil unions35 reject the claim that 
 
 33. See infra Appendix II.A (listing the twenty states that bar civil unions equivalent to 
marriage). The “equality” being forbidden in these twenty state marriage amendments is between 
marriage and other domestic relationships. The words “equal” or “equality” do not appear in any 
of the thirty-one state marriage amendments. 
 34. That is, they express the view that the relationship contributions to society of such 
alternative unions are not equal or equivalent value to society as those of male-female marriages. 
 35. The term “civil union” describes a legal domestic-relationship status that provides all 
or most of the (and functionally equivalent) benefits, privileges, rights, and duties of marriage to 
same-sex (and sometimes other) couples who are not eligible to marry. The states that have cre-
ated “civil unions” but call them by some other label, such as “domestic partnerships,” include 
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same-sex unions are the same as, or are fully equal or equivalent to 
marriage as a comprehensive legal status or legal institution. These 
eleven states do not necessarily reject the claim that same-sex couples 
who want to make a life-long legal commitment to each other should 
be able to receive legal benefits, privileges, rights, and responsibilities 
that are generally equivalent to, comparable to, similar to, or the same 
as those available to a married male-female couple. Nor do they accept 
as a matter of constitutional certainty the claim that the contributions 
to society of same-sex unions are equal or equivalent to those of male-
female marital unions in terms of their meriting the conferral of equal 
or equivalent non-marital domestic relationships status, benefits, du-
ties, and responsibilities. They do not accept as a matter of constitu-
tional certainty the claim that conferring equal or equivalent non-mar-
ital domestic relationships status, benefits, duties, and responsibilities 
upon same-sex couples would not harm, undermine or endanger the 
important gender-integrating social institution of marriage, or that to 
do so would not harm society and particular (vulnerable) members of 
society. Instead, they presumably believe that such claims and argu-
ments should be considered and decided by the normal legislative pro-
cesses, or they simply do not believe such blanket, absolute, non-equiv-
alence claims regarding extension of marriage-like benefits, privileges, 
and duties to same-sex and other non-marital couples. 
As a largely unmentioned collateral effect, all thirty-one of the 
state marriage amendments clearly define marriage as a monogamous 
relationship only. By defining marriage as the union of “one man and 
one woman,” or the union of “a man and a woman” they clearly, con-
stitutionally exclude polygamous and other polyamorous unions from 
eligibility for “marital” status. They further directly prohibit recogni-
tion of polygamous and polyamorous relationships as “marriages.” 
Since the growing Islamic faith allows polygamy,36 and since there re-
cently has been some additional, unrelated interest in and promotion 
 
California, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, and Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 11 and ac-
companying text. Thus, 38% of the states constitutionally ban same-sex marriage, while eight 
other states have created “civil unions.” 
 36. See Napp Nazworth, Religion Census: Increase in Evangelicals, Mormons, Muslims; De-
crease in Catholics, Mainline Protestants, Christian Post (May 2, 2012, 6:08 AM), 
http://bit.ly/Z3AQ0p (“A decennial census of U.S. religions in Americans was released Tuesday 
by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies . . . . The results show a dramatic 
increase in the number of . . . Muslims. . . . Muslims saw the greatest growth rate among the five 
main religious groups studied. Their numbers increased by 66.7 percent in the 2010 census from 
a decade earlier.”). 
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of polyamory,37 this aspect of the state marriage amendments may set-
tle an emerging marriage issue constitutionally at the state level before 
it emerges as a full-blown social issue. One wonders if the implications 
of the marriage amendments for polyamory, today so noncontroversial 
and neglected, in thirty or forty years might become the most contro-
versial and significant. 
B. Equality Claims for Same-Sex Marriage in U.S. Constitutional Law 
The constitutional doctrine of Equal Protection in American ju-
risprudence recognizes that it is not a violation of constitutional equal-
ity to treat different things differently. “The Constitution [of the 
United States] does not require things which are different in fact . . . 
to be treated in law as though they were the same.”38 Equal protection 
doctrine “embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike 
but may treat unlike cases accordingly.”39 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has long recognized that “[d]ifferences in circumstances beget appro-
priate differences in law. The Equal Protection Clause was not de-
signed to compel uniformity in the face of difference.”40 Accordingly, 
“discrimination with respect to things that are different” does not vio-
late the Equal Protection clause.41 
Professor Philip B. Kurland distinguished two ways in which the 
equal protection clause has been used to restrain the power of the state 
to treat people differently. 
In its more general, less meaningful, and most used formulation, the 
 
 37. “[P]ost-modern polygamy has moved from being a utopian dream or an interesting 
thought experiment, to being a real, albeit fringe, American social practice.” Maura I. Strassberg, 
The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 439, 442 
(2003); see 3 The Lesbian Polyamory Reader: Open Relationships, Non-Monogamy, and 
Casual Sex (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds., 1999); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s 
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277 
(2004); Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 643, 660 (2004) (“[T]he same-sex marriage debate is quickly moving toward poly-
amory . . .”); ’Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1461 (2011); 
Marisa Black, Note, Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique Familial Constructions, and the 
Law, 8 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 497 (2006); Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage: The Road to Polyamory, 
Wkly. Standard, Aug. 4, 2003, http://bit.ly/YxCg6U. 
 38. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 
141, 147 (1940)); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 481–82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
 39. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 
(1982)). 
 40. Whitney v. State Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 309 U.S. 530, 542 (1940). 
 41. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934). 
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Court has held that all persons within a class must be similarly treated 
by the state. That leaves unresolved the hard issues of how the class 
may be defined and how much leeway is left to the relevant govern-
ment body in defining the class. Thus: “[W]hat the equal protection 
of the law requires is equality of burdens upon those in like situation 
or condition.”42 
Insofar as gender has any meaning whatever, it inherently estab-
lishes that men and women belong to different gender classes. Thus, 
this branch of equality jurisprudence does not compel same-sex mar-
riage. 
A second utilization of the [equal protection] clause in terms of the 
power of the state to classify is meaningful, definite, and usually ig-
nored. Here the proposition is that there are certain factors that a 
state is precluded from taking into consideration in establishing clas-
ses. Mr. Justice Jackson called these “neutral facts” and thereby, un-
knowingly, damned the standard to purgatory or worse. Concurring 
in Edwards v. California, he said: “The mere state of being without 
funds is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, 
creed, or color.” Mr. Justice Harlan I, in his dissent in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, thought that color was a neutral fact and could not form the 
basis for imposing a burden or failing to grant a benefit. “Our Con-
stitution,” he said, “is color-blind . . . .” It has been suggested that 
religion is a neutral fact on the basis of which the state may not clas-
sify either to grant or deny benefits or to impose or relieve from bur-
dens. To date, however, the “neutral facts” notion has been utilized 
by the Court only to prevent unfavorable discrimination by the 
state.43 
Marriage is not only intimately and extensively involved with state 
regulation and channeling of procreation and child-rearing, but also to 
the formation of families that entail learning to live intimately with 
persons of the other gender. Thus, with the social interest in sustaining 
the core social institution in which men and women unite to comple-
ment and enhance the strengths and weaknesses of the other gender,44 
it is irrational and unrealistic to insist that gender is a “neutral fact” 
 
 42. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1964) (quoting S.C. ex rel. 
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1915)). 
 43. Kurland, supra note 42 at 146–47 (footnote omitted). 
 44. Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of 
States Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 771, 779–80 (2001) (listing 
eight social interests in and legal purposes of marriage). 
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regarding the social interests in marriage. 
Nor does eliminating gender-integration in marriage further 
equality-as-tolerance. William Eskridge has linked the gay rights con-
stitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court to the principle 
of tolerance: 
The jurisprudence of tolerance is a conservative theory of judicial re-
view, and it is the theory that best justifies, and perhaps inspires, the 
positions taken by the Court in Lawrence and other recent gay rights 
cases. Ironically, it is a theory that justifies a fair amount of activist 
judicial review—not just the invalidation of consensual sodomy laws 
in Lawrence, but also the Court’s ruling that a sexual-orientation an-
tidiscrimination law could not constitutionally be applied to require 
the Boy Scouts to retain an openly gay scoutmaster. [Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).] What the cases share is the 
Court’s commitment to lowering the stakes of identity politics. The 
LGBT social movement wants to persuade America that gay is good, 
while the traditional family values (TFV) countermovement wants to 
persuade America that many gay rights would undermine the family, 
marriage, and other cherished institutions. This is a fine debate for 
America to have. The Court is simply insisting that the players not 
hit below the belt and turn a fair fight into a brawl.45 
The principle of “equality-as-tolerance” has been promoted to 
support same-sex marriage.46 Interestingly, as Professor Bruce Hafen 
noted many years ago, the law can regulate relationships in three ways: 
prohibit, tolerate, or prefer them. Historically, same-sex relationships 
were prohibited by the law. On the other hand, marriage is the classic 
example of a relationship that historically was, and today still is, pre-
ferred in law.47 In the past few decades, the laws in many jurisdictions 
 
 45. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower 
the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1025 (2004); see also Linda C. McClain, 
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Tol-
eration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 19, 22–23 (1998) (arguing that equality-as-tolerance is too 
narrow and equality-as-respect would justify same-sex marriage). 
 46. Id.; see also James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 
18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 72 (1994) (quoting Kurt Krickler, Report on ILGA’s 
Participation in the CSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues Warsaw, 27 
Sept. –14 Oct. 1993, Euro-Letter (Int’l Lesbian and Gay Ass’n), Nov. 21, 1993) (“Tolerance 
plays also an important part in the attitude of the state towards persons of different sexual be-
longing.”). 
 47. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual PrivacyBal-
ancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 546–47 (1983) (“The law creates 
a natural spectrum with protected activity on one extreme, prohibited activity on the other ex-
treme, and a broad range of permitted activity in the middle.”); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 
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have moved to tolerate (neither prohibit nor privilege) same-sex rela-
tionships. Advocates of same-sex marriage seek to move the law fur-
ther. However, because marriage is a highly preferred, privileged legal 
relationship, the claim for same-sex marriage is not merely a claim for 
tolerance, but a claim for special privilege and special preference. 
Likewise, equality-as-respect fails to mandate legalization of same-
sex marriage. It is important to respect persons in same-sex relations 
as individuals with full civil rights. But marriage should not be taken 
hostage to prove respect. Giving marriage licenses to people is not nec-
essary to respect people; our marriage laws deny marriage licenses to 
many people whose relationships are incompatible with the special 
purposes of marriage such as siblings and other closely-related persons, 
under-age persons, and already-married persons.48 
The crux of the constitutional dispute is whether gender-integra-
tion is important for the achievement of significant state interests con-
cerning the regulation of marriage. Assuming for the sake of argument 
that a heightened (at least intermediate) standard of review may be ap-
plied, establishment of the equality claim for same-sex marriage re-
quires the establishment of at least one of two critical propositions: (1) 
that there are no significant differences between men and women, or 
(2) that any gender differences that do exist are irrelevant to (or do not 
significantly advance) the important purposes the state has for regulat-
ing marriage. 
The first (androgyny or gender-neutrality) proposition not only 
flies in the face of common experience and common sense,49 but also 
contradicts a legion of gender-equality cases. These cases recognize 
not only that men and women are different in profound ways, but 
acknowledge that those gender differences make different and distinctly 
valuable contributions to society in innumerable ways that enrich society 
 
308–12; Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 
BYU L. Rev. 1, 61 (1996) (“Legalizing same-sex marriage would ignore the distinction between 
tolerance and preference by extending the highest legal preferences to relationships which our 
society historically has condemned and which, even now, the most sympathetic states have chosen 
only to tolerate. The confusion comes when proponents of same-sex marriage assert that because 
homosexual relations are tolerated they are entitled to a state-endorsed preferred status.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
 48. See Lynn D. Wardle, Christopher L. Blakesley & Jacqueline Y. Parker, 1 
Contemporary Family Law, chps. 2–3 (1988) (describing numerous marital restrictions and 
formalities in state laws). 
 49. Jennifer Thieme, The Freedom to Marry: A Liberal Value that Conservatives Should Shun, 
Daily Caller (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://bit.ly/12ixFZu. 
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by including both men and women in virtually all of the major institutions 
and sectors of our society. A long line of cases acknowledges that gender 
differences make different and distinctly valuable contributions to so-
ciety in innumerable ways that enrich society by the inclusion of both 
men and women in virtually all of the major institutions and sectors of 
our society.50 It is too late in the history of our constitutional jurispru-
dence to deny that the law recognizes the fact that men and women are 
different in innumerable, profound, and socially significant ways. Like-
wise, it is futile to deny that an intimate domestic union of two men or 
of two women creates a different kind of domestic relationship with 
importantly different qualities and characteristics than the marital un-
ion of a man and a woman. That those differences do not justify many 
forms of legal discrimination (such as in difference-irrelevant kinds of 
employment and eligibility for difference-neutral government bene-
fits) simply underscores that there are very real gender differences. 
The second (marital essentials) proposition also fails as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine. The appendices overwhelmingly show that in 
U.S. interstate comparative constitutional law, the integration of male 
and female is considered to go to the essence of marital relations and 
is the core and fundamental element of the social institution of mar-
riage. As a matter of global principles and comparative international 
constitutional law, respect for the importance of integrating genders 
in marriage is even greater. If gender-integration is not a ubiquitous 
requirement for marriage in the nations of the earth, it is undeniably 
the pervasively prevailing, and nearly-ubiquitous requirement of mar-
riage in the world today. And until just a dozen years ago it was histor-
ically the constant, unexcepted, ubiquitous marriage requirement in all 
societies through all history.51 Thus, the application of the equality 
 
 50. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971); Taunya Lovell Banks, Thurgood Marshall, the Race Man, and Gender Equality in the 
Courts, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 15, 19–20 (2010) (“According to one study, between 1971, 
when the Court in Reed v. Reed invalidated on equal protection grounds a state law preferring 
men over women as administrators for estates, and 2002, the Supreme Court decided forty-one 
cases involving gender employment discrimination claims.” (citation omitted)); Justin Driver, The 
Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1101, 1116 (2012). 
 51. See Wardle, Blakesley & Parker, supra note 48, §§ 2:46–2:48 (discussing physical 
requirements for marriage including dual-gender union); Robert P. George, What’s Sex Got to Do 
With It? Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, 49 Am. J. Juris. 63, 73 (2004); Sherif Girgis, Robert 
P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is Marriage?, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 245, 247 (2010). 
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principle in U.S. constitutional law should justify (and usually has jus-
tified) the limiting of legal marriage to dual-gender couples.52 
Moreover, judicially interpreting equal protection provisions of 
the Constitution in a way that mandated legalization of same-sex mar-
riage would contradict and undermine core principles of American 
constitutionalism. The Founders of the U.S. Constitution, and the 
eighteenth-century Republican political theory upon which they drew 
in drafting the Constitution, emphasized the importance of democratic 
processes and recognized the simultaneous need for and risks of 
“parchment” protections of fundamental, inalienable human rights. 
The Founders were very leery of relying for protection from 
abuses of government tyranny on mere “parchment barriers”—mere 
words put down on some revered “parchment.”53 They preferred to 
rely instead upon the solid protection of structure.54 That is one of the 
principal reasons for the Founders’ objection to and rejection of any 
listing of a “Bill of Rights” in the original Constitution of 1787.55 
 
 52. See McConnell v. United States, 188 Fed. App’x 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006); Citizens for 
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating there was a good 
reason for the restraint displayed in Baker); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304–05 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (holding that Baker constitutes binding precedent requiring dismissal of case); Adams 
v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (stating that Baker was controlling, but 
that court would reach same conclusion de novo); Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 504 
(Cal. 2004) (stating that Baker sets forth federal constitutional law with respect to same-sex mar-
riage, and not undermined by Lawrence); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Ind. App. 
2005) (stating that Baker shows the Court did not think Loving supported argument by same-sex 
couples); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 
802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (App. Div. 2005) (finding Baker binding precedent on equal protection 
issue); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 999 (Wash. 2006) (following Baker in rejecting 
claim of constitutional right to same-sex marriage). See also Dale M. Schowengerdt, Defending 
Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex “Marriage,” 14 Regent U. L. Rev. 487 (2002) 
(reviewing court decisions holding that prohibiting same-sex marriage does not violate Equal 
Protection); Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Lov-
ing Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 How. L.J. 117, 139 (2007) (analyzing Loving’s analogy to 
racial anti-miscegenation laws). 
 53. This memorable phrase was the language of James Madison. See John C. Eastman, 
Philosopher King Courts: Is the Exercise of Higher Law Authority Without a Higher Law Foundation 
Legitimate?, 54 Drake L. Rev. 831, 832 (2006) (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 The Writings of James Madison 271–72 (G. Hunt ed., 1964)). 
 54. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, in The Essential Federalist and 
Anti-Federalist Papers 301 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 55. See Eastman, supra note 53, at 832; Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Pos-
itive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657. 666–67 (2011); Richard G. 
Wilkins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 525, 531–32 (1992). 
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James Madison expressed those concerns most famously in The Fed-
eralist No. 10,56 where he explained the need to divide governmental 
power to structurally set power against power to prevent tyranny by 
any branch of government.57 
Madison doubted that constitutional rights could do much to prevent 
political majorities or other powerful factions from having their way. 
Rights that protected the politically weak against the politically 
strong would be unenforceable; they would simply be disregarded or 
overridden. Justifying to Jefferson his opposition to a bill of rights, 
Madison argued that “experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of 
rights on those occasions when its controul is most needed. Repeated 
violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by over-
bearing majorities in every State.”58 
Fellow Virginian James Randolph likewise declared, “I have no 
faith in parchment.”59 Another delegate to the Virginia Constitutional 
Convention, Abel Upshur, likewise declared that no “paper guarantee 
was ever yet worth any thing, unless the whole, or at least a majority 
of the community, were interested in maintaining it.”60 Roger Sher-
man, the Connecticut delegate to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 
explained: “No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer 
than the honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were 
interested in preserving the rights . . . .”61 Other Founders shared and 
expressed similar views.62 
One of the grave objections to including a bill of rights in the Con-
stitution was that “the enumeration might unwittingly expand the 
power of the federal government. In Hamilton’s words, a bill of rights 
 
 56. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in The Essential Federalist and Anti-Fed-
eralist Papers 167 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 57. Id.; see also Eastman, supra note 53, at 833. 
 58. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 666–67 (quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Jack N. Rakove, Declaring Rights 160, 161 
(1998). 
 59. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1286, 1299 (2012) (citing 42 Annals 
of Cong. 2361 (1824)). 
 60. Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 59, at n.40 (citing Jesse T. Carpenter, The 
South as a Conscious Minority, 1789–1861: A Study in Political Thought 141 (1990)). 
 61. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 721 (citing Roger Sherman, A 
Countryman, II, New Haven Gazette (Nov. 22, 1787), reprinted in Essays on the Constitu-
tion of the United States 218, 219 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892)) (emphases omitted). 
 62. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, 376–
82 (1969) (citing Noah Webster); see also Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 666–
68. 
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containing ‘various exceptions to powers not granted’ might ‘afford a 
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.’”63 In factin ways 
not fully foreseen or explicitly considered by the Foundersthe Bill of 
Rights, and some other constitutional provisions, including the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have afforded 
courts enormous policy-making powers to legislate and make policy 
decisions (under the cloak of interpreting those provisions) that the 
Founders intended to be made by the people and their elected repre-
sentatives. 
Many constitutional scholars agree. Professor John Hart Ely is 
joined by many others who share the Madisonian perspective that the 
truly essential, and lasting, part of the Constitution “is a design of gov-
ernment with powers to act and a structure arranged to make it act 
wisely and responsibly. It is in that design, not in its preamble or its 
epilogue, that the security of American civil and political liberty lies.”64 
As Professor Eastman has explained: 
In the end, Madison and other opponents of a bill of rights agreed to 
propose amendments once the new Constitution was ratified, and 
they proceeded to honor that pledge in the First Congress. But Mad-
ison drafted the new amendments with great care so as not to create 
the implication that they were merely “abridgements of prerogative 
in favor of privilege” or “stipulations between kings and their sub-
jects.” Rights were not granted by the Bill of Rights but recognized, 
echoing back to the Declaration’s claim of inalienable rights.65 
Application of the “equal protection” provision has proven to be 
susceptible to the same kinds of abuses that led to such reticence to 
adopt and care in defining the Bill of Rights. Similar prudence and care 
is needed in interpreting the equal protection provision lest it become 
a tool for the illegitimate judicial imposition of same-sex marriage 
upon reluctant citizens. 
C. Equality Claims as Justifications for Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in 
Other Countries 
While the equality claims for same-sex marriage in the United 
 
 63. Wilkins, supra note 55 (citing The Federalist, No.84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 64. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in Toward a More Per-
fect Union 108, 128 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995); see also Levinson, Parchment and Politics, 
supra note 55, at 667 n.18; Wilkins, supra note 55, at 530–33. 
 65. Eastman, supra note 53, at 833 (emphasis in original). 
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States have emphasized equality-as-equal/equivalent or equality-as-re-
spect, in Europe the equality claims have primarily emphasized equal-
ity-as-tolerance. For example, the first nation to legalize same-sex 
marriage was the Netherlands, which has a long, proud, prominent 
tradition of tolerance. “From the very beginning, tolerance as a cul-
tural concept was relevant to how officials were supposed to relate to 
morally ambivalent questions. [For example,] [i]n the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, tolerance meant that those in power accepted 
the existence of religious views that were not compatible with official 
doctrine.”66 Perhaps the condition of the country (i.e., small, below sea 
level, religiously pluralistic, a trading nation, etc.) nurtured the devel-
opment of tolerance as a core principle of the Dutch.67 Even today, the 
Dutch are leaders in social and legal tolerance of many behaviors that 
are strictly prohibited in most other nations because of their unique 
understanding of “tolerance.” Legally, in the Netherlands, 
[T]olerance refers to policies of nonprosecution of things forbidden 
in the Criminal Code or other codes. Gedogen is the current Dutch 
word . . . . This form of tolerance is not necessarily the same as “in-
difference.” Nor is it necessarily “turning a blind eye.” Ordinarily it 
means that administrative or punitive reactions are postponed if the 
perpetrator agrees to act according to precise instructions.68 
Some commentators suggest that the Dutch generally are uninter-
ested in moral analysis, which they associate with religion, because 
they view themselves as nonreligious69—the Dutch way of dealing with 
moral questions is to not ask questions, instead taking a “live and let 
live” attitude.70 Thus, clearly Dutch legalization of same-sex marriage 
connotes no endorsement, acceptance, or embracing of same-sex mar-
riage, but expresses a recognition of the value of setting aside differ-
ences in order to promote a common end for the good of the political 
 
 66. Ybo Buruma, Dutch Tolerance: On Drugs, Prostitution, and Euthanasia, 35 Crime & 
Just. 73, 76 (2007) (emphasis added); see also Isaak Kisch, The Netherlands: Caution and Confidence 
in a Democratic Society, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 834 (1954). 
 67. Buruma, supra note 66, at 78 (“[T]olerance was forced on people who were living to-
gether. Much of the land is below sea level. It had to be reclaimed from the sea by hardworking 
people from all religions. They had to work together—even if they considered one another her-
etics or heathens.”). 
 68. Id. at 85. 
 69. See Kisch, supra note 66, at 833–34; see also Herbert Hendin, The Dutch Experience, 17 
Issues L. & Med. 223, 243–44 (2002). 
 70. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Why the Netherlands?, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 95, 100 
(2002). 
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community.71 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that 
“[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and 
is entitled to protection by society and the State.”72 Similar statements 
about the foundational importance and specially-protected role of 
families are found in dozens of other international conventions, com-
pacts, and instruments.73 Some examples include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,74 the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,75 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,76 the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion,77 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.78 
Advocates of same-sex marriage have long argued that these docu-
ments should be interpreted to provide a right to same-sex marriage. 
Those claims have been notably unsuccessful. These human rights 
charters have not been interpreted as requiring member states to re-
define marriage to include same-sex couples. For example, in 2002 in 
Joslin v. New Zealand,79 the United Nation’s Human Rights Commit-
tee affirmed that the internationally recognized civil right of marriage 
 
 71. Buruma, supra note 66,66 at 80–81. 
 72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See Jane Adolphe, The Holy See and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Working Toward a Legal Anthropology of Human Rights and the Family, 4 Ave Maria 
L. Rev. 343 (2006); Don Browning, The Meaning of Family in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, in 1 The Family in the New Millennium 38 (A. Scott Loveless & Thomas B. Holman 
eds., 2007); Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1153 (1998). 
 73. See Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 
BYU J. Pub. L. 439 app. II, at 483 (2006) (listing 35 international treaties, charters, conventions, 
and other instruments with provisions acknowledging the importance of families or marriage). 
 74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10 § 1, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 76. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 77. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, available at http://www.hcch.net/in-
dex_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24. The Convention became enforceable on Dec. 1, 
1983. 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
HccH.net, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 78. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 79. Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc’n No. 902/1999, Human Rights Committee, 75th 
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created by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
confers the obligation on states “to recognize as marriage only the un-
ion between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other.”80 This 
became the touchstone of understanding these human rights docu-
ments, and the various member states have been left to determine for 
themselves what recognition will be given other domestic relation-
ships. Similarly, in Rees v. United Kingdom,81 the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the right to marry, as protected by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights,82 applies only to “traditional mar-
riage,” leaving the individual states free to individually determine the 
nature and degree of recognition to extend to other relationships.83 
In 2010 in Schalk v. Austria,84 the European Court of Human 
Rights held definitively that the European Convention on Human 
Rights does not require member countries to legalize or even recog-
nize same-sex marriages. Upholding the Austrian government denial 
of the two gay petitioners’ request to legally contract a marriage, and 
agreeing with the Austrian court’s holding that disallowance of same-
sex marriage did not violate the Convention, the European Court held 
that the Convention did not confer or protect any right to same-sex 
marriage: 
The Court observes that, looked at in isolation, the wording of Arti-
cle 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the marriage between 
two men or two women. However, in contrast, all other substantive 
Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to “everyone” 
or state that “no one” is to be subjected to certain types of prohibited 
treatment. The choice of wording in Article 12 must thus be regarded 
as deliberate. Moreover, regard must be had to the historical context 
in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was 
clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between 
partners of different sex.85 
 
Sess., July 8–26, 2002, CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (July 30, 2002). 
 80. Id. at 11 para. 8.2. 
 81. Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). 
 82. European Convention on Human Rights, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS No. 5, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+pr
otocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/. 
 83. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R at para. 49. 
 84. Schalk v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., HUDOC (24 June 2010), available at http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99605. 
 85. Id. at para. 54–55. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law [Vol. 27 
514 
Similarly, the Court ruled that the Convention’s non-discrimina-
tion article,86 “Article 14[,] taken in conjunction with Article 8, a pro-
vision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as 
imposing such an obligation [to legalize same-sex marriage] either.”87 
Petitioners claimed also that Article 14 was violated because even 
though they now could register their partnership in Austria, they were 
“discriminated against as a same sex-couple on account of certain dif-
ferences conferred by the status of marriage on the one hand and reg-
istered partnership on the other.”88 The Court of Human Rights re-
jected that claim noting the margin of appreciation accorded states, 
and the lack of consensus within Europe on the point, that registered 
partnerships in Austria were “a legal status equal or similar to marriage 
in many respects” with “only slight differences in respect of material 
consequences, [but] some substantial differences . . . in respect of pa-
rental rights.”89 However, it was important to the Court to note that 
the scheme “corresponds on the whole to the trend in other member 
States [in Europe].”90 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was 
“no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with 
Article 8.”91 
Just this year, that interpretation of the Convention was recon-
firmed. In March 2012, the European Court of Human Rights de-
clared in Gas v. France92 that “Article 12 of the Convention does not 
impose an obligation on the governments of the Contracting States to 
grant same-sex couples access to marriage.”93 While it is to be expected 
that some pro-same-sex union developments will come in the future—
given the political nature of the issue—the consistent, overwhelming 
 
 86. Article 14 must be considered the equality provision of the European Convention; it 
is a non-discrimination provision barring discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms secured by the Convention. “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.” European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 
82, at art. 14. 
 87. Schalk, Eur. Ct. H.R., HUDOC, at para.101. 
 88. Id. at para. 107. 
 89. Id. at para. 109. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at para. 110. 
 92. Gas v. France, Euro. Ct. H.R., HUDOC (15 March 2012), available at http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109571. 
 93. Id. at para. 66; see also Donna Bowater, Gay Marriage is not a Human Right, According to 
European Ruling, Telegraph (Mar. 21, 2012), http://bit.ly/14PKRWr. 
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rejection of the claim for same-sex marriage in the global arena to this 
point is noteworthy. 
Thus, as a matter of comparative constitutional law and interna-
tional law, the trend to legalize same-sex marriage seems to have stalled 
(though it is inching forward—in a total of ten nations in the past 
twelve years). The trend now seems to be against same-sex marriage, 
with the sole regional exception of a few jurisdictions in Western Eu-
rope and a few former European colonies in North America and else-
where. The global norm is not to recognize same-sex marriage, but to 
protect as a matter of international human rights the ability of each 
nation to settle that policy issue for itself. 
IV. Why the General Jurisprudential Theory of 
Equality Supports the Constitutional  
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage 
Equality can be said to include and be designed to achieve (protect) 
tolerance.94 As the roots of the word suggest, tolerance includes the no-
tion of reciprocity—a reciprocal “bear[ing] with” someone or some-
thing undesired, and a mutual self-restraint regarding the tolerated ac-
tivity, condition, or situation.95 The dilemma of equality and tolerance 
as legal principles in modern liberal democracies is that there must be 
some positive value, some virtue, that motivates and justifies the toler-
ance and equal protection of ideas and practices that others conclude 
are wrong, dangerous, bad, and harmful. History is filled with too 
many examples that show that relying on the personal virtue, self-con-
trol, and endurance of individuals, their ability to “put up” with and 
co-exist with wrongs and those who advocate and practice them, is not 
sufficient to produce genuine, let alone long-lasting, tolerance or 
equality. 
Toleration, as Bernard Williams once remarked, is an “impossible 
 
 94. In this regard, I modestly diverge from Professor Steven D. Smith’s otherwise excel-
lent analysis and critique of equality. He sees equality as a value distinctly different from and 
competing against tolerance, and calls for a revival of tolerance. See SMITH, supra note 1; Smith, 
supra note 2. I see equality as having both equality-as-tolerance dimensions and equality-as-neu-
trality distortions. 
 95. See Anthony Esolen, Tolerance and Reciprocity, Pub. Discourse (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/09/6452 (“The Latin tol- is related to a group of words 
having to do with carrying a burden: German dulden, to be patient, to endure; Old English tholian, 
to suffer; Latin tuli, I have borne. When we tolerate we bear with someone or something; we bear 
the existence of a wrong . . . because . . . to protest would invite a greater wrong”). 
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virtue.” It is impossible because it involves accepting, and abiding or 
accommodating views that one rejects. It calls us to live in cognitive 
dissonance and presents contradiction as a sought after goal. We are 
obliged to “bear” what in fact we find unbearable. Of course, if we 
did not find this, that, or the other word or deed objectionable, there 
would be no call to tolerate them. . . . Viewed from one perspective 
then, tolerance is indeed a virtue so demanding as to be “impossible” 
of realization, perhaps even logically untenable, involving us in the 
laws of contradiction. 
. . . [T]olerance is far from being a sufficient virtue. . . . Tolerance, 
with its historical associations of suffering the presence of what is de-
testable . . . is too feeble a thing to promote.96 
Reliance upon the “grin-and-bear-it” virtue of citizens and gov-
ernment officials produces only temporary and unstable tolerance and 
shallow and limited equality. Thus, Professor Steven Smith has de-
scribed two flaws with the neutral-equality ideal in modern liberalism: 
First, without an accepted set of substantive values—an orthodoxy—
the ideals of neutrality and equality are incapable of guiding or con-
straining public policy. Thus, public neutrality toward substantive 
values can never be achieved. Second, even if such neutrality could 
be achieved, a regime committed to value-free neutrality or equality 
would be incapable of commanding the respect and loyalty of its cit-
izens. In short, substantive neutrality is impossible; and even if it were 
possible, it would be morally insupportable.97 
 
 96. Adam B. Seligman, Tolerance, Tradition and Modernity, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1645, 
1646 (2003) (footnote omitted) (citing Bernard Williams, Toleration: an Impossible Vir-
tue 18–28 (David Heyd ed., 1996)). 
 97. Smith, supra note 2, at 313. Professor Smith posits that modern equality jurisprudence 
developed in three stages, beginning with adoption of the principles of tolerance (most notably 
and influentially expressed by John Locke in his 1689 work, A Letter Concerning Toleration), but 
that liberal thinkers later substituted equality for tolerance in order to provide broader protection 
for unpopular minorities (most notably and influentially James Madison in his writings protecting 
religious liberty). That focus on equality led to the adoption of neutrality-as-equality, the attitude 
of state neutrality and the official adoption of a policy of ‘equality’ towards all competing groups. 
“In the eyes of the state, or of the law, all groups and individuals are entitled to ‘equal concern 
and respect’ regardless of their political ideology, religious faith, or moral commitments.” Smith, 
supra note 2, at 311; see also Smith, supra note 1, at 11–20. 
Without disputing his first and third points, Smith’s second point might be contested. That is, it 
is possible to read Madison as suggesting that full equality is a defining element of toleration, and 
not as substituting equality for toleration. Thus, it is possible to reconcile toleration and equality 
as two sides of the same coin rather that cast them as different, competing values. In this inter-
pretation, the only real and significant conceptual change occurred when the notion of tolerance-
as-equality morphed into the notion of equality-as-substantive-neutrality. 
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That probably is why many wise philosophers from Greek to mod-
ern times have taught “that without a shared conception of justice, 
genuine political community is impossible.”98 
But commitment by the polis to any shared substantive value or 
principle as the basis for equality or tolerance creates a conundrum, for 
it would exclude tolerating and giving equal protection to the ideas and 
persons that reject the underlying substantive value. What principle 
can provide the “shared value” that can sustain tolerance and equal-
ity?99 Liberty provides the solution to the conundrum of equality and 
tolerance. Liberty is at least a procedural principle, protecting as a mat-
ter of recognizing the separate and independent jurisdiction, the sov-
ereignty of other individuals under the rule of law in the political com-
munity, to decide for themselves important matters. Liberty justifies 
tolerance because it commands respect for the sovereign dignity of all 
members of the community—for us, as well as all others. Protection of 
our own liberty is linked to and dependent upon equal protection of 
the liberty of all other members of the polis. Thus, because we honor 
liberty, we tolerate bad ideas and practices that others are at liberty to 
live and advocate; because our own valued liberty is implicated, we 
equally protect the liberty of others to make choices that we believe 
are bad, wrong, and even harmful. 
But liberty does not mean the right of any individual to do what-
ever he or she wants, whenever and however and to whomever he or 
she wants. The founders of the American republic were very interested 
in protecting individual liberties as well as protecting society, and they 
described some clear boundaries of individual liberty; they defined 
them in terms of protecting the political community. Later, John Stu-
art Mill articulated his classic modern liberal definition of the limits of 
individual liberty in terms of not harming others.100 
A. The Distortions of “Equality” 
While equality has been a core, distinguishing characteristic and 
ideal of the American republic since its earliest days, the dangers of 
 
 98. Smith, supra note 2, at 327 (citing A. Macintyre, After Virtue 244 (2d ed. 1984)); 
see also id. at 328 (“[A] healthy political community must stand for something. If it does not, then 
it becomes a mere aggregation of jarring individual atoms; politics and government become a 
battleground, and law, to those who lack the power to dictate its content, will be mere coercion.”). 
 99. See Smith, supra note 1, at 143 (suggesting that genuine mutual respect is the neces-
sary common value for sustaining equality-as-tolerance). 
 100. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859). 
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distorting the ideal of equality have been apparent from the beginning 
of our constitutional democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville famously re-
ported in Democracy in America101 that Americans enjoyed an unprece-
dented “equality of condition”102 in their new nation, but noted the 
underlying tension between the principles of liberty and equality.103 
De Tocqueville celebrated that the ideal democratic nation is one in 
which the citizens “will be perfectly free, because they will all be en-
tirely equal, and they will all be perfectly equal because they will be 
entirely free.”104 But, he warned that their passion for equality would 
overcome their passion for liberty: “[T]hey call for equality in free-
dom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slav-
ery.”105 
More recently, Professor Peter Western explained that equality is 
an “empty” idea lacking substantive content;106 it is a formal concept 
only and thus useless for deciding any significant issue.107  
Equality simply means that like cases should be treated alike—a 
proposition with which no one really disagrees. What people do dis-
agree about is whether some particular case really is like some other 
case in relevant respects. But the notion of equality does nothing to 
help resolve that sort of disagreement.108 
Equality justification actually obfuscates the substantive contest and 
masks the true basis for the resolution of the issue.109 As Professor Ste-
ven D. Smith puts it: “If we see controversial issues being debated 
 
 101. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve, trans., Phillips 
Bradley, ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 11th ed. 1972) (1835). 
 102.  Id. at 3. 
 103.  2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 96 (Henry Reeve, trans., Phil-
lips Bradley, ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 11th ed. 1972) (1840). 
 104. Id. at 94. 
 105. Id. at 97; see also Alexis de Tocqueville Quotes, Goodreads, http://www.good-
reads.com/author/quotes/465.Alexis_de_Tocqueville (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (“Americans are 
so enamored of equality, they would rather be equal in slavery than unequal in freedom.”); (“[I]t 
every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circum-
scribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The 
principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them 
and often to look on them as benefits.”); (“[T]here are no surer guarantees of equality among 
men than poverty and misfortune.”). 
 106. Peter Western, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). 
 107. See id. at, 566–67. 
 108. Smith, supra note 1, at 13. 
 109. See id. at 13–14. 
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mainly in terms of what ‘equality requires,’ in short, we will have rea-
son to suspect in advance that some kind of cheating—or deception, 
or self-deception—is going on.”110 
Thus, as a matter of jurisprudential principles, the principle of 
equality only masks the real reasons for resolving, one way or another, 
the controversy over legalizing same-sex marriage. What is needed is 
a discussion of the values, virtues, moral goods and purposes, and social 
interest in marriage. As Michael Sandel argues, whether same-sex mar-
riage should or should not be legalized requires “recourse to contro-
versial conceptions of the purpose of marriage and the goods it hon-
ors.”111 As a matter of moral analysis, the question turns on the nature 
and purposes of the social institution of legal marriage and on the qual-
ities and characteristics of same-sex and opposite-sex couples. As Pro-
fessor Sandel asserts: “The debate over same-sex marriage is funda-
mentally a debate about whether gay and lesbian unions are worthy of 
the honor and recognition that, in our society, state-sanctioned mar-
riage confers. So the underlying moral question is unavoidable.”112 
Since equality analysis only masks and obscures those underlying social 
and moral questions, it impedes rather than facilitates the intelligent, 
coherent resolution of the same-sex marriage issue. 
Finally, the cost of establishing an equality claim for same-sex mar-
riage is the destruction of the very institution of marriage that the 
equality claim seeks to make accessible to same-sex couples. Only by 
devaluing and diminishing marriage, only by neutralizing and aban-
doning the core, historic (still nearly-ubiquitous globally) dual-gender 
value component of the institution of marriage might those equality 
principles provide meaningful support for same-sex marriage 
claims.113 Yet, “[a]s Alexander Bickel explained: ‘. . . valueless institu-
tions are shameful and shameless and, what is more, man’s nature is 
 
 110. Id. at 14. 
 111. Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 253 (2009); see also 
Russell Muirhead, Minerva’s Owl” The Tradition of Western Political Thought. By Jeffrey Abramson, 
89 Tex. L. Rev. 671, 683–85 (2011) (reviewing, inter alia, Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s 
the Right Thing to Do? (2009)), Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Respecting Freedom 
and Cultivating Virtues in Justifying Constitutional Rights, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1311, 1321–27 (2011); 
Jeffrey Abramson, Book Reviews, Justice Takes a Stand, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 653, 655–662 (2011) (re-
viewing SANDEL). 
 112. Sandel, supra note 111, at 254. 
 113. See Thieme, supra note 49. 
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such that he finds them, and life with and under them, insupporta-
ble.’”114 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has revealed that in most legal systems, including most 
American states and most federal constitutional jurisprudence, as well 
as in the law and jurisprudence in most other nations, equality princi-
ples do not require legalization of same-sex marriage as a matter of 
constitutional or fundament human rights doctrines. Rather, only in a 
few legal systems, equality doctrines have been interpreted to require 
legalization of same-sex marriage. 
Equal protection and tolerance, based on respect for individual lib-
erty in our constitutional system might require some legal recognition 
or protection of some status and benefits for same-sex couples who 
otherwise satisfy the commitments and other essential requirements of 
unions that contribute significantly to the social good. But equal pro-
tection and tolerance do not require disregarding the importance of 
the core, essential value of gender-integration in marriage. 
The risk of equality jurisprudence is its tendency to obfuscate the 
real issues, and to make real, competing interests. Whether equality 
notions require legalization of same-sex marriage ultimately depends 
upon identifying and understanding the nature and goods of the insti-
tution of marriage, and upon our best assessment of how well same-
sex couples contribute to the nature and goods of the institution of 
marriage, especially as compared to male-female couples. Those mat-
ters should be examined and discussed openly and transparently, not 
behind the veil of equality that obscures the issues and not through the 
surrogate language of equality notions. 
Likewise, the equality-as-tolerance claim for same-sex marriage 
depends upon liberty and the limits of liberty (whether liberty should 
include the liberty to marry a same-sex partner). The limits of liberty 
are set by a determination of the harmful impacts of its exercise upon 
other persons and institutions in society (e.g., whether same-sex mar-
riage will harm or weaken the institution of marriage or persons in 
society). Again, open, transparent, full, respectful discussion is needed 
to make that assessment. 
These are difficult and delicate questions on which reasonable per-
sons may hold very strong and differing viewpoints. Because the issues 
 
 114. Smith, supra note 2, at 328. 
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matter deeply and differently to different people, there is a constant 
temptation to resort to strident rhetoric that is accusatory, including 
charging those who disagree with being judgmental or motivated by 
ulterior motives (including animus or ideological blindness). That kind 
of rhetoric certainly chills and discourages the important civic dialogue 
that needs to occur in order for us to reach a responsible decision. As 
Judge Thomas B. Griffith put it: 
Disagreement is critical to the well-being of our nation. But we must 
carry on our arguments with the realization that those with whom we 
disagree are not our enemies; rather, they are our colleagues in a 
great enterprise. When we respect each other enough to respond 
carefully to argument, we are filling roles necessary in a republic.115 
Open, full, serious, vigorous, respectful dialogue about these diffi-
cult and sensitive issues is essential not only to answering rightly the 
question whether equality requires legalization of same-sex marriage, 
but also whether process is an essential component of equality itself. 
It would be a misuse and abuse of the equal protection guarantee 
for judges to interpret it as constitutionally mandating the legalization 
of same-sex marriage. Determinations about what marriage means and 
which of many different forms and styles of adult relationships and liv-
ing arrangements properly merit the legal status of marriage under our 
Constitution are for the people to decide, either by their elected rep-
resentatives or directly. 
The structural dimension of equal protection protects the right of 
all citizens to have an equal opportunity to influence and equal power 
to determine public policy on such fundamental issues as whether to 
redefine marriage to include same-sex couples. The 2012 elections 
have shown that the issue can be fairly and properly decided through 
democratic processes. Judicial interpretation of the equal protection 
clause—a provision that was intended to protect the rights of persons 
from unjust discrimination—deprives the people of the right to protect 
their marriages and to preserve the social institution of marriage as the 
gender-integrating institution it has been for millennia. This depriva-
tion would be a distortion of the equal protection provision and would 
be profoundly and harmfully ironic. 
  
 
 115. Thomas B. Griffith, The Work of Civility, BYU Mag., Fall 2012, available at 
http://magazine.byu.edu/?act=view&a=3076. 
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Appendix I: The Legal Acceptance of Same-Sex Marriage 
and Unions in the United States and Globally  
Legal Status—31 December 2012116 
A. Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Unions in the United States 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Nine U.S. States (18%), the 
District of Columbia, and Two Indian Tribes
Connecticut 
Iowa 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
New York 
Washington117  
Vermont 
District of Columbia 
Coquille Tribe 
Suquamish Tribe118 
  
 
 116. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the 
United States, Lambda Legal, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs_recogni-
tion-of-same-sex-couples-worldwide.pdf (last updated Mar. 29, 2011), Status of Same-Sex Rela-
tionships Nationwide, Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nation-
wide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last modified June 8, 2012), Bea Verschraegen, The 
Impact of European Family Law on National Legal Systems, in 2 Central and European Coun-
tries after and Before the Accession 63, 63–65 (2011); cf. Jennifer C. Pizer & Sheila 
James Kuehl, The Williams Institute, Same-Sex Couples and Marriage (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Pizer-Kuehl-Model-Mar-
riage-Report.pdf. 
 117. The question of whether to legalize same-sex marriage was decided by voters in Maine, 
Maryland, and Washington in November, 2012, and voters in Minnesota decided whether to 
adopt a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage. 
 118. Two of 564 U.S. Indian tribes allow same-sex marriage while six have banned it. Trista 
Wilson, Comment, Changed Embraces, Changes Embraced? Renouncing the Heterosexist Majority in 
Favor of a Return to Traditional Two-Spirit Culture, 36 Am. Indian L. Rev. 161, 177–78 (2012) 
(“The two largest Native American tribes, the Cherokees and the Navajos, both passed legislation 
prohibiting same-sex marriage. . . . Four other tribes passed legislation limiting marriages to those 
between a man and a woman: the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians, located in Michigan; and the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Iowa Tribe, and Chickasaw Nation, all located in Oklahoma. . . . [But 
i]n 2008, the Coquille Tribe of Oregon became what is believed to be the first tribe to extend 
marriage rights to same-sex couples, so long as one of the partners is a tribal member. In August 
2011, the Suquamish Tribe, located in Washington, also extended full marital rights to same-sex 
couples.”). 
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Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage (“Civil Unions”) Are 
Legal in Eight U.S. States (20%) and the District of Columbia. 
California119 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
Oregon  
Illinois 
Hawaii  
Delaware  
Rhode Island  
District of Columbia120 
Same-Sex-Union Registry and Specific, Limited Benefits in 
Two More U.S. Jurisdictions.
Colorado Wisconsin 
  
 
 119. California formerly had same-sex marriage by judicial decree for about four-and-one-
half months in 2008 before the voters passed Proposition 8, rejecting same-sex marriage. 
 120. Some civil unions may be superseded by legislation legalizing same-sex marriage if it 
is approved. California and Nevada call them “domestic partnerships” but in substance they are 
marriage-equivalent civil unions. See supra notes 11, 35. Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, and the District 
of Columbia also allow heterosexual couples to contract civil unions, but same-sex marriage may 
eventually replace civil unions. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law [Vol. 27 
524 
B. Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Unions Globally 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Permitted in Ten (or Eleven) Nations.121 
The Netherlands  
Belgium  
Canada  
Spain  
Norway 
Sweden  
Portugal  
Iceland  
Argentina  
Denmark  
(and arguably South Africa) 
Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Are Allowed in Sev-
enteen or Sixteen Other Nations (9%).122
Ecuador  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Luxembourg  
South Africa  
Slovenia  
Andorra  
 
Brazil  
Switzerland 
United Kingdom  
Uruguay  
New Zealand  
Austria  
Ireland  
Liechtenstein  
and (most of) Australia123 
Same-Sex Partnerships (Formal but Not Equal to Marriage) 
Are Allowed in Five or More Nations.
Columbia  
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Israel 
  
 
 121. A civil union has most or all of the same legal qualities of marriage but is called some-
thing else. E.g., South Africa had legalized same-sex “civil unions,” which can be can be created 
by way of “marriage” and can be called “marriages,” but the Marriage Act was unamended to 
only allow male-female marriage. See Civil Union Act 29441 of 2006 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843; see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Pro-
posed Minnesota Marriage Amendment in Comparative Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, 
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y (forthcoming Spring 2013). Same-sex marriage also is allowed in 
sub-jurisdictions of some nations (e.g., the USA (certain states), Mexico (City) and by specific-
case court decisions in others (Brazil)). Some nations recognize foreign same-sex marriages but 
do not allow same-sex marriages to be contracted domestically. 
 122. See supra note 13 (re South Africa). 
 123. Same-sex cohabitation is recognized in all Australian states and territories, and regis-
tration of such civil unions is permitted in most states and territories of Australia. Civil unions 
also are allowed in several states in the United States, and in some other sub-jurisdictions, like 
Greenland 
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Appendix II: The Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Marriage 
and Unions in the United States and Globally 
Legal Status—31 December 2012124 
A. Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Unions in the United States 
Thirty-one States (62%) and Six Indian Tribes Prohibit 
Same-Sex Marriage by Constitutional Amendment.  
Twenty States (40%)* Also Ban Civil Unions.
Alaska 
Alabama* 
Arkansas* 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Florida* 
Georgia* 
Hawaii 
Idaho* 
Kansas* 
Kentucky* 
Louisiana* 
Michigan* 
Mississippi  
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska* 
Nevada 
North Carolina* 
North Dakota* 
Ohio* 
Oklahoma* 
Oregon 
South Carolina* 
South Dakota* 
Tennessee 
Texas* 
Utah* 
Virginia* 
Wisconsin*125 
Cherokee Tribe 
Navajo Tribe 
Sault Tribe 
Muscogee Tribe 
Iowa Tribe 
Chickasaw Tribe 
 
  
 
 124. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the 
United States, Lambda Legal, http://bit.ly/10yiHcV (last updated Sept. 12, 2011), Status of Same-
Sex Relationships Nationwide, Lambda Legal, http://bit.ly/Za6uIQ (last modified June 8, 2012), 
Bea Verschraegen, The Impact of European Family Law on National Legal Systems, in 2 Central 
and European Countries after and Before the Accession 63, 63–65 (2011);  cf. Jennifer 
C. Pizer & Sheila James Kuehl, Same-Sex Couples and Marriage, The Williams Institute (Aug. 
2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Pizer-Kuehl-
Model-Marriage-Report.pdf. 
 125. The asterisk (*) indicates that civil unions are also banned. The pound symbol (#) 
means that the amendment is structural. In addition to the states that have adopted marriage 
amendments, in Maine in 2009 the “People’s Veto” vote overturned a law allowing same-sex 
marriage before the law took effect. Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for the First 
Time, CNN Politics (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-
same-sex-marriage/index.html. But, in November 2012, Maine voters narrowly legalized same-
sex marriage. Id. In May 2012, a state marriage amendment passed in North Carolina with over 
61% of the vote. North Carolina Passes Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN Projects, CNN Politics 
(May 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/index.html. 
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B. Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Marriage Globally 
At Least 47 of 193 Sovereign Nations (24%) Have Constitu-
tional Provisions Defining Marriage As a Union of Man and 
Woman.126 
Armenia (art. 32) 
Azerbaijan (art. 34) 
Belarus (art. 32) 
Bolivia (art. 63) 
Brazil (art. 226) 
Bulgaria (art. 46) 
Burkina Faso (art. 23) 
Burundi (art. 29) 
Cambodia (art. 45) 
China (art. 49) 
Columbia (art. 42) 
Cuba (art. 43) 
Democratic Republic of Congo (art. 
40) 
Ecuador (art. 38) 
Eritrea (art. 22) 
Ethiopia (art. 34) 
Gambia (art. 27) 
Honduras (art. 112) 
Hungary (art. M - April 2011) 
Japan (art. 24) 
Latvia (art. 110 - Dec. 2005) 
Lithuania (art. 31) 
Malawi (art. 22) 
Moldova (art. 48) 
Mongolia (art. 16) 
Montenegro (art. 71) 
Namibia (art. 14) 
Nicaragua (art. 72) 
Panama (art. 58) 
Paraguay (arts. 49, 51, 52) 
Peru (art. 5) 
Poland (art. 18) 
Romania (art. 48) 
Rwanda (art. 26) 
Serbia (art. 62) 
Seychelles (art. 32) 
Somalia (art. 28) 
South Sudan (art. 15) 
Spain (art. 32, disregarded or over-
turned by legislation) 
Sudan (art. 15) 
Suriname (art. 35) 
Swaziland (art. 27) 
Tajikistan (art. 33) 
Turkmenistan (art. 25) 
Uganda (art. 31) 
Ukraine (ark. 51) 
Venezuela (art. 77) 
Vietnam (art. 64)127 
 
 126. See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (1997) Cap. 383, 7, § 8, art. 19 (H.K.), avail-
able at http://bit.ly/X810ng. The Spanish law allowing same-sex marriage—in facial violation of 
the constitution—was upheld by the country’s highest court. See Carmen Garcimartín, The Span-
ish Law on Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Arguments, 27 BYU J. Pub. L. 399 (2013) (this 
symposium); Iciar Reinlein & Sarah Morris, Same-Sex Marriage Upheld by Spain’s Highest Court, 
Reuters (Mar. 29, 2012), http://reut.rs/YtDylo. 
 127. Constitutions, supra notes 21, 24-26; Political Constitution of the State 2009, art. 63 
(Bolivia); Constitution of the Republic of Burundi Mar. 18, 2005, art. 29; Constitution of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Feb. 18, 2006, art 40; The Constitution of Mongolia Jan. 13, 
1992, art. 16(11); Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama Oct. 11, 1972, art. 58; Con-
stitution of Romania Oct. 29, 2003, art. 48; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda Jun. 4, 2003, 
art. 26; Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles Jun. 21, 1993, art. 32; Harmonized Draft 
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Constitution for the Republic of Somalia Jun. 12, 2012, art. 28; Spanish Constitution Dec. 27, 
1978, art. 32; Interim Nat’l Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan Jul. 6, 2005, art. 15; see 
Political Constitution of Colombia, art. 42 (the family “is formed . . . by the free decision of a man 
and woman to contract matrimony” (emphasis added)); Constitution of Japan, art. 24 (“Marriage 
shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual 
cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.” (emphasis added)); “ . . .”Consti-
tution of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, ch. VIII, art. 110 (“The State shall protect and support marriage—
a union between a man and a woman[.] . . .” (emphasis added)); Constitution of the Republic of 
Uganda, Oct. 8, 1995, art. 31 (“Marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited.” (emphasis 
added)). 
